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"Allegiance" is the willingness of a national public to approve of and to support 
actively the decisions made by a government, in return for economic and social 
security. European allegiance does not depend on how people look at European 
integration, but originates in national allegiance. It depends on a double 
allegiance. Social policy is a critical instrument of statecraft in the welfare state 
which has the capacity to foster allegiance to the nation-state. Governments of 
nation-states attempt to nourish allegiance by providing social and economic 
security. The major reason for this is that national allegiance is and remains the 
primary source of political power. This explains why most social policies have 
remained the exclusive competence of national authority, why social policy is 
such a contested political domain in the European Union, why national welfare 
states have been so resistant to change, and why the current threat to national 




























































































The concept of allegiance is particularly useful for understanding the complex 
and problematic relation between a national citizenry, a nation-state, and a 
transnational or supranational polity. This paper deals with the role of national 
publics and social policy in the process of national and European integration. 
Anticipating the conceptual discussion below, allegiance is defined — somewhat 
idiosyncratically perhaps — as the willingness of a national public to approve of 
and to support actively the decisions made by a government, in return for a 
more or less immediate and straightforward reward or benefit to which the 
public is entitled on the basis of it having rendered approval and support.
A relation properly described by allegiance is not simply characterized by the 
loyalty, trust and obedience of the ruled, but most critically by an exchange 
between a ruler and the ruled, consisting of a pay-off between security and 
support. The notion of allegiance would enable one to grasp better the historical 
and contemporary role of European publics in the integration process and may 
introduce a new view on the problems of political order, legitimacy and identity. 
Although I take issue with some writings on legitimacy and identity (e.g., 
Bellamy et al. 1995; Franklin et al. 1994; Garcia 1993; Flix 1995; Hbrek 1995; 
Laffan 1993; Marks 1996; Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995; Obradovic 1996; 
Weiler 1993), I should stress here that I am not arguing that the concept of 
legitimacy should be replaced by the notion of allegiance, but only that 
"allegiance" is discloses what legitimacy tends to miss, namely the crucial 
condition of security in the exchange relation between a ruler and the ruled.
The general hypothesis is that European allegiance does not depend on how 
people look at European integration. How a public understands the European 
Community or Union (EC, EU) in a general way is most likely largely 
inconsequential. Moreover, it is unlikely that people evaluate the legitimacy of 
the EC or EU’s political institutions and decision-making processes in any 
meaningful sense. Finally, the extent to which people are attached to locality, 
region or country is arguably not directly related to their "European" attachment 
(see Marks 1996). Instead, European allegiance must be viewed as originating 
in national allegiance. National allegiance, in turn, is contingent on national 
social and economic performance. To the extent that a national citizenry
1 I would like to thank Sven Bislev, Alan Milward and the participants of the Allegiance- 




























































































perceives European integration as dysfunctional to national social and economic 
security, national allegiance is not guaranteed.
European integration, therefore, depends on a double allegiance, consisting of 
a primary allegiance to the nation-state and its political elite and a secondary 
allegiance to the EC or EU. Secondary allegiance, however, exists to the extent 
that European integration facilitates nation-states to provide the resources upon 
which primary allegiance hinges. Primary allegiance emerges via a reciprocal, 
advantageous transaction relation between governments and publics within the 
nation-state.
The more specific hypothesis is that social policy is a critical instrument of 
statecraft in the welfare state (Banting 1995) and that social policy has the 
capacity to foster allegiance to the nation-state. Governments of nation-states, in 
addition to guaranteeing territorial integrity, attempt to nourish allegiance by 
providing social and economic security. The major reason for this is that 
national allegiance is and remains the primary source of the political power of 
the elite that drives the integration process. This explains why most social 
policies have remained the exclusive competence of national authority, why 
social policy is such a contested political domain in the European Union (see 
e.g., Hantrais 1995; Leibffied and Pierson 1995a), why national welfare states 
have been so resistant to change, and why any threat to national social security 
tends to jeopardize European allegiance.
Allegiance and "The European Rescue of the Nation-State"
The idea of double allegiance is adopted from what I take as the key theoretical 
idea of Alan Milward’s (1992: 3) The European Rescue o f the Nation-State, 
namely that
"(•••) without the process of integration the West European nation-state might not have 
retained the allegiance and support of its citizens in the way that it has. The European 
Community has been its buttress, an indispensable part of the nation-state’s post-war 
construction. Without it, the nation-state could not have offered to its citizens the same 
measure of security and prosperity which it has provided and which has justified its 
survival".
The notion of allegiance is in many ways crucial to the argument. The modem 
nation-state is conceived as a complex political organization of mutual political 




























































































achieved but by the extension of obligations of the rulers to the ruled in order 
to effect the allegiance of the public. But the scope of the necessary extension 
of functions went far beyond the capacities of nation-states. The rescue of the 
nation-state in the context of increased interdependence required in the post- 
Second World War period the surrender of sovereignty. This explains the 
construction of the European Community.
The nation-states followed a strategy of integration because this was "(•••) one 
way of formalizing, regulating and perhaps limiting the consequences of 
interdependence, without forfeiting the national allegiance on which its 
continued existence depends" (Milward 1992: 19). National allegiance was 
secured and a secondary allegiance developed among national citizens, because 
the national publics understood that integration was necessary and in their own 
interest. The phenomenon of double allegiance was bom. Secondary allegiance 
did not significantly weaken primary allegiance, but the former depended on the 
latter.
National government that was restored after the war turned out to be qualita­
tively different from the pre-war form of government, because it was based on 
a new distribution of political power. Ultimately, the power of the state remained 
grounded in the use of force. "The cruel penalties imposed by its judges, the 
weapons of its police and armed forces were what, finally, commanded 
allegiance" (Milward 1992: 24). The two qualitatively distinctive features of the 
post-1945 power structure, however, concerned the diminished need for force 
and the foundation of state power on a broader political consensus. Both were 
crucial for allegiance.2
The reconstruction of the post-1945 state originated in the pre-war experience 
of the collapse of the nation-state. Despite variations there emerged a common 
European model of the nation-state, built on a foundation of broad political 
consensus. The common model consisted of two features:
1. The inclusion of formerly excluded social classes and a realliance of 
political coalitions: "labour, agricultural producers, and a diffuse alliance 
of lower and middle income beneficiaries of the welfare state" (Milward
2 Already before the war the construction of allegiance, still ultimately depending on 
force, was sought in expanding the significance of national symbols and myth, in responding 
more effectively to the demands of citizens, in extending political rights, in securing a higher 
standard of living, and in providing social security. This pre-war attempt to save the nation­
states from collapsing by securing allegiance, of course, failed dramatically, both nationally 




























































































1992: 27). The extension of the franchise mattered, but "the more 
powerful impulses were the desire for security, the general sentiment that 
only the nation-state could offer it, and the need for national parliamen­
tary government to restore its legitimacy by purchasing allegiance" 
(Milward 1992: 27);
2. The development of political parties as machines of allegiance that 
intermediated between public and public policy in response to the above 
mentioned powerful impulses.
The solution to unemployment, first, was seen as crucial to the issue of 
allegiance, because it was not only a waste of resources, but had also proven to 
be a threat to political order and obedience. The inclusion and (incomes) 
protection of the agricultural sector, next, was equally viewed as necessary for 
allegiance as this sector had proved especially susceptible to non-democratic and 
extremist political pull. Finally, the welfare state was built with a view to 
generate and support a nation-wide consensus.
These developments and measures were associated and added up, although 
largely coincidentally, to a distinctive welfare effect.
"Support for agricultural incomes was an essential support to the welfare state; poor 
farmers would otherwise have made bigger demands on social insurance systems. High 
levels of state expenditure on housing construction and other aspects of the economy, 
such as defence and social security, sustained employment levels by sustaining 
demand. Full employment gave social insurance a much sounder actuarial basis. Social 
insurance systems, in their turn, provided governments with a larger financial reserve 
with which to pursue counter-cyclical economic policies aimed at maintaining high 
employment" (Milward 1992: 33).
What was in fact being produced were various national "consensuses". But these 
national consensuses depended in part on the internationalized economies. Hence 
the stimulus for international cooperation and integration.
"The common policies of the European Community came into being in the attempt to 
uphold and stabilize the post-war consensus on which the European nation-state was 
rebuilt" (Milward 1992: 44).
The general argument is underpinned by the historical evidence derived from a 
number of detailed case studies. The study of the decline of the Belgian coal 




























































































how the nation-state reasserted itself through the help of the Community.3 The 
Belgian government had always seen the supranational policy and authority as 
a means to support national policies and goals.
"It was a source of authority outside the nation which could be appealed to for help, 
blamed for unpopular policies which were also those of the government itself, and, 
when it suited the mood, caricatured as a technocratic dictatorship trampling the rights 
of Belgian underfoot" (Milward 1992: 116).
The crucial interpretation is that "the Belgian government had judged correctly 
in 1950 that integration would provide needed, and unembarrassing, support for 
combining the management of industrial decline with high welfare and high 
employment. It had very little to lose and much to gain" (Milward 1992: 118). 
What it had to gain, of course, was national allegiance.
The explanation of the origins of the European Community concurs with the 
general argument.
"Given the tendency of the post-war west European state to justify itself ideologically 
as the guarantor of the social and economic advance of its citizens; given the ensuing 
tendency to take a somewhat exalted view of the power of foreign trade and 
particularly of exports; given the velocity with which foreign trade in western Europe 
did grow; given the way in which this growth did contribute to the growth of 
efficiency, incomes and choice; a European solution was necessary. Domestic policy 
was not in the end sustainable unless this neo-mercantilism could be guaranteed by its 
Europeanization" (Milward 1992: 134, italics added).
The creation of the common market is explained by reference to it being 
virtually the only possible solution to the problem of securing the nation-state 
and national allegiance in a context of economic interdependence.4 Equally, the
3 "In the 1960s employment policy, including regional policy, can be seen as a conscious 
attempt, firmly supported by the Community, to hold together the Belgian nation" (Milward 
1992: 115). And furthermore, "On almost every count Belgium’s entry into the European Coal 
and Steel Community reinforced national policy. Without supranational support that policy 
would have been harder to carry out. Where there were differences of opinion national policy 
was never in danger of having to change, except slowly and marginally. The real reason for 
this was the strength of mutual assumptions about stability, welfare and the need for a 
managed interventionist response to economic change. In circumstances like that it was easy 
to internationalize policy" (Milward 1992: 116, italics added).
4 ’The will of the European nation-state to survive as an organizational entity depended 
on the prosperity which sustained the domestic post-war political compromises everywhere. 




























































































Europeanization of agricultural policy is explained by reference to the 
impossibility of problem solution within a national framework and the risk of 
the breakdown of allegiance. To secure the incomes in agriculture without 
jeopardizing the allegiance of other national social interests created the dilemma 
for which a common agricultural policy provided the solution.5 A corollary of 
the argument, highlighted by a study of the attitude of Britain towards Europe, 
is that not joining the European Community was against the interest of the 
nation-state. In fact, the failure to sign the Treaties of Rome is seen as a serious 
mistake.6 By stressing sovereignty and independence, arguably also conditions 
of national allegiance, the British decision not to join may nevertheless have 
jeopardized allegiance.
The idea of allegiance is central in the rescue-argument. Generally speaking, the 
rescue and reassessment of the nation-state critically depended on national 
allegiance. Economic interdependence and the diminished capacity of the nation­
state to provide security and prosperity created the necessity of international, 
transnational or supranational cooperation. Integration helped safeguarding 
national or primary allegiance and establishing secondary or European 
allegiance.
Conceptually and substantially there remains some ambivalence in the rescue- 
argument, because the exact meaning of allegiance is not clearly defined. For
and economic thought of the time. West Germany was the pivot on which the increases in 
foreign trade, investment and prosperity turned. It was essential for political and economic 
reasons that West Germany be bound to the west, but it needed an arrangement that satisfied 
the economic interests of Western European countries if a durable way of doing this was to 
be found. The common market was the one durable way that had been found’ (Milward 1992: 
223).
5 ’Would national taxpayers and voters have continued so long to pay the costs of income 
support for agriculture as the size of the agricultural sector and its weight in the national 
economy rapidly declined, had the decision been set in a purely national context? Surely not. 
(...) Because it was shrinking so rapidly, Western European agriculture was the most 
vulnerable of all the elements in the post-war political consensus. It has proved to be, 
however, because of the Europeanization of agricultural policy, one of its most durable 
components’ (Milward 1992: 317).
6 ’In refusing to join, British governments were weakening the nation more than defending 
its sovereignty. They were left to carry their own burdens of welfare and agricultural policy 
and the consequences for manufacturing industry were immediate. Economically and 
politically Britain’s role became increasingly peripheral and the benefits from not having 
joined the Communities were reduced to no more than the preservation of that same illusion 




























































































instance, allegiance can both be commanded (by force) and purchased in order 
to restore legitimacy. But can allegiance really arise through force and what is 
the difference between allegiance and legitimacy? Also, allegiance and support 
are used interchangeably and sometimes both allegiance and support are given 
to a nation-state at the same time. Is there no difference between support and 
allegiance? The next section tries to provide some conceptual clarification.
Towards a Relational Concept of Allegiance
It is appropriate to pose the following questions: 1) what precisely do we mean 
by allegiance; and 2) in what context may it be analytically useful to employ the 
notion? My general answer to the first question is that allegiance is the 
willingness of a national public to approve of and to support actively the 
decisions made by a government, in return for a more or less immediate reward 
or benefit to which the public is entitled on the basis of it having rendered 
approval and support. My answer to the second question consists of the 
proposition to view the concept of allegiance as analytically useful for 
understanding the complex and problematic relationship between a national 
citizenry, a nation-state and its government, and a transnational or supranational 
polity.
A relation properly described by allegiance is not simply characterized by the 
loyalty, trust and obedience of the ruled, but most critically by an exchange 
between a ruler and the ruled, consisting of a pay-off between security (and 
prosperity) and support. The "goods" of security (prosperity) and support are 
varied and manifold. Security offered by a government can be territorial, 
physical, economic, and social and may range from the protection against war 
and occupation to compensation for the hardships of social and economic life in 
a market economy. Support offered by a public can be political, economic, 
social and civil and may range from various forms of social and political 
participation and the willingness to pay taxes to the general inclination to 
observe the law. The notion of allegiance enables one to grasp better the 
problem of political order, legitimacy and identity from the public’s point of 
view.
Historically, the concept described the relationship between a liege and a liege 
lord and referred to the duty of the liege to obey and support the liege lord and 
to the right of the latter to decide for the former. Allegiance is necessarily a 




























































































described by allegiance the implied rights and duties are correlative. It is a 
dyadic relation where a subject has the right to be protected as well as the duty 
to obey and support and where the ruler has both the right to decide and the 
duty to provide security. Allegiance involves a dyadic exchange relation and the 
currency of this bond as well as the guarantee of its stability consists of trust and 
security rather than, for instance, the presence of third party as a dispute 
resolver.
Allegiance describes the relation between the ruled and the ruler, between a 
subject and a sovereign, between a public or citizenry and a government. The 
subject confides in the ruler and the ruler in the subject. This remarkable 
"confidence" is rooted in a double expectation, because both parties in the 
relation anticipate a reward or benefit: protection, security and prosperity in 
return for submission and support, and submission and support in return for 
protection, security and prosperity. Implied in this relation between a public and 
a government is that when protection and security are not guaranteed, then 
ultimately obedience and active support decline, and when support and 
obedience are not delivered, then ultimately the capacity to rule — and therefore 
the capacity to deliver the goods — decreases.
Allegiance is conceptually close and directly related to the notion of legitimacy. 
However, there are some important differences that are usually confused. One 
example already cited exemplifies how the concepts are linked, but sometimes 
confused. The most powerful impulses for establishing a new political consensus 
in the post-war era in Western Europe were "the desire for security, the general 
sentiment that only the nation-state could offer it, and the need for national 
parliamentary government to restore its legitimacy by purchasing allegiance" 
(Milward 1992: 27). In this case allegiance is the constitution of legitimacy. 
However, I think this is not entirely correct and a short discussion of the concept 
of legitimacy will clarify this.
Legitimacy is multi-dimensional and comprises three levels (Beetham 1991: 15- 
19): legality, normative justifiability, and legitimation. Political power is 
legitimate to the extent that
”- it is acquired and exercised according to established rules (legality); and
the rules are justifiable according to socially accepted beliefs about a) the 
rightful source of authority and b) the proper ends and standards of 
government (normative justifiability); and
positions of authority are confirmed by the express consent or affirmation on 
the part of appropriate subordinates, and by recognition from other legitimate 




























































































Normative justifiability is the key to legitimacy, because disagreements at this 
level cause problems at the other levels. For the present purposes it is sufficient 
yet important to note that legitimation, the third dimension of legitimacy, is 
similar to the meaning of allegiance in this paper. Express popular consent 
involves actions that publicly demonstrate voluntary agreement and confer 
legitimacy on the powerful (Beetham 1991: 91, 150). The third dimension of 
legitimacy comes indeed very close to what I understand to be allegiance. 
However, a difference is that allegiance does not focus on the demonstration of 
consent, but on the pay-off relation between a government and the governed, 
where the latter publicly demonstrate their consent in return for security, i.e. the 
deliverance of a good. Allegiance is much more than appointing and affirming 
political authority legitimately, for instance, in elections. Allegiance also points 
to and touches upon civil obedience, foi instance with regard to paying taxes and 
contributions, or in a more general sense with regard to obeying and 
implementing the laws in return for the benefit of being governed well.
The point is that all criteria of legitimacy may be met, yet allegiance may not 
occur. A government may have acquired political power legally according to 
established rules (criterion 1), the rules may be socially accepted and so may the 
political programme of the government (criterion 2), and the ruled may have 
expressed their consent by having elected the government (criterion 3). 
Nevertheless, allegiance may still be problematic, because the government does 
not or cannot — possibly for reasons outside its power — deliver economic and 
social security.
Allegiance as I understand it differs from legitimacy in four important respects. 
First, legitimacy refers to both the rightfulness of the institution of government 
and the actual government, whereas allegiance describes the relation between the 
actual rulers and the ruled. Secondly, allegiance has a more "active" connotation 
as it presupposes the subject’s broad and active support for the ruler and not 
merely passive acquiescence or express consent. Moreover, the concept of 
allegiance has this connotation only by virtue, thirdly, of it describing a 
beneficial exchange between the ruled and the actual ruler, where the ruler 
delivers security. Allegiance presupposes a pay-off. Finally, legitimacy is — on 
the basis of the criteria specified — a property of the decision-making processes 
and the political institutions, while allegiance looks at the relation between rulers 
and ruled from the public’s point of view.
Legitimacy, then, has a more "passive" connotation in that it only asks for a 
general acquiescent acceptance and express but diffuse consent and not for an 




























































































performance. Legitimacy, in short, does not presuppose an exchange relation, 
which can be clarified when one appreciates that according to legitimacy one 
ought to accept decisions as legitimate even if these adversely affect one’s 
interests (see Obradovic 1996). Allegiance does not allow for this possibility.7
In the present context allegiance is a concept which is also to be preferred over 
identity. There is a decisive reason for this. The debate on identity (and its 
impact on legitimacy) in the EU almost entirely depends on the pivotal 
assumption that the making of a new polity (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 1997) 
necessarily depends on the existence or development of a single European 
identity. Since every national polity to a large extent was built on a national 
identity, the European polity must equally depend on a European identity. And 
since there is no such thing as a single European identity, the legitimacy of the 
polity is to be seen as problematic and questionable. In addition, the EU itself 
challenges national identity. Thus, Laffan (1996: 82) argues that "European 
nation-states developed on the basis of a relative congruity between bounded 
territory, functional tasks and a shared identity. This congruity is no longer 
assured as the link between territory, governance and identity is eroded at 
national level and is not replaced by an equivalent set of institutions and shared 
symbols elsewhere". The Eurobarometer surveys show a continued attachment 
of national publics to the local, regional, and national levels (Marks 1996) and 
the erosion of the link between territory, governance and identity is therefore 
questionable, at least from the publics’ point of view. It is the assumption on the 
necessary congruity of the polity of a nation-state and national identity which 
creates the problem of identity in the European polity. Relaxing this assumption 
would reveal that such a problem of identity may not be as crucial as many tend 
to argue. Many issues with respect to identity and legitimacy in Europe are only 
problems to the extent that the comparison between nation-state building and the 
European integration is maintained.
Let me give three examples. "Representative politics is still largely national 
which constitutes a barrier to the emergence of a genuinely European political 
realm "(Laffan 1996: 93, italics added). But the question is: what precisely is 
genuine if one drops the analogy with the nation-state? "Political communities 
are based not just on rational calculation but on sentiment, solidarity and a 
degree of political cohesion" (Laffan 1996: 95). Again, dropping the analogy 
generates the question why a European sentiment, solidarity and sense of
7 Comparable reflections would be valid in the case of the conceptual resemblance 
between allegiance on the one hand, and loyalty, fidelity, and devotion on the other hand, 




























































































political cohesion should need to bolster the European polity? "A European 
identity is not likely to transcend national identities but may develop as a weaker 
form of identity in a hierarchy or circle of identities" (Laffan 1996: 98). If this 
is the case, then what is the point of problematizing identity at European level? 
I am not arguing that the concept of identity is to be avoided for all analytical 
purposes and I think it is right to point to problems of immigration and 
citizenship. But I do argue that focusing on identity has the drawback of 
presupposing a parallel development between a national political community and 
the EU. This assumption is flawed.
Social policy in the Welfare State as an Instrument of Statecraft
The social and territorial integration of the nation-state has nowhere emerged 
spontaneously and mechanically. The formation of national states has been 
generally characterized by fierce social and political struggles, by failed attempts 
to appease class and ethnic wars, and by violent clashes over the construction 
of a single, national political community and identity (e.g., Tilly 1990; Mann 
1993). It was only after the Second World War that in some parts of Western 
Europe effective mechanisms of social and political conflict resolution were 
institutionalized and that the legitimacy and territorial integrity of nation-states 
became fairly well entrenched.
One does not need to employ a functionalist argument to understand that the 
welfare state as a structural component of post-war advanced industrial 
democracies has had two pivotal integration effects.8 The first is social 
integration and concerns the variable extent to which social policies and welfare 
arrangements effectively mediate, regulate and reconcile social conflicts, 
particularly class conflicts (see Van Kersbergen 1995; 1997). The second is 
national or territorial integration and involves the extent to which the welfare 
state successfully and positively constructs and reinforces a national political 
community. Both effects have been critical for post-war state-building and for 
the political legitimacy of the nation-state.
Following Banting (1995: 271), social policy can be seen "as an instrument of 
statecraft, to be employed in defining political communities and legitimating the
8 I deliberately use the term "effect" rather than function, because the latter term would 
mistakenly suggest that the origin and development of the welfare state can be explained in 




























































































structures of the state". This makes clear why I think it also makes sense to look 
at national allegiance rather than legitimacy or identity as a crucial constituent 
of successful social and political integration. It is allegiance that best describes 
an exchange relation between a political community (the ruled) and its legitimate 
government within a given nation-state (the ruler). No matter how legitimate 
authoritative decisions by a government may be as evaluated against legality, 
normative justifiability and legitimation, ultimately these are binding only to the 
extent that they are grounded on the tacit consent as well as active support of 
the citizenry in return for the actual deliverance of security and prosperity. This 
clarifies why in this context allegiance is preferred over legitimacy or identity, 
because allegiance presupposes a relation of exchange between the rulers and the 
ruled and because the currency of the exchange consists of the (physical, 
economic and social) security and prosperity which a national government offers 
to its constituency in return for tacit consent and active support.
It is important to stress, however, that a social and political order can never be 
assumed to be inherently stable as rapidly changing social, economic and 
political conditions create a permanent need to adapt. Both the reconciliation of 
social conflicts and the construction of a national political community are never 
fixed properties of a polity because they are built on social and political 
alliances and their institutionalization that are permanently challenged. Instead, 
social and political integration must be seen as a continuous, dynamic, 
contingent, and — as the resurgence of ethnic, religious, regional and cultural 
conflicts in Europe demonstrates — sometimes highly precarious process. 
National welfare states, however stable they may seem, are therefore per­
manently confronted with a dual problem of integration and the task of 
reaffirming and reinforcing integration is never accomplished. On the contrary, 
it is a permanent assignment that properly belongs to the continuous political 
responsibility of national governments.
If allegiance has as its core the idea of an exchange and if it is the case that the 
currency of the relation consists of security and prosperity in return for active 
support, then surely social security is crucial for national allegiance. But if social 
security is crucial for national allegiance, why did social policy at least until 
1985 not get a more prominent place on the agenda of European integration in 
order to ensure the nation-state’s capacity to deliver social security?
1 think that the idea of double allegiance is helpful. As argued, social policy is 
a pivotal instrument of statecraft in the welfare state. It has the capacity to foster 
allegiance to the nation-state, reinforcing the national basis of political power. 




























































































seems inconsistent with the thesis on social policy and national allegiance. 
However, we are dealing, not with an inconsistency, but with a paradox.
European integration, shortly defined as a higher level of integration which 
involves the voluntary delegation of national authority to a supranational polity, 
has depended on double allegiance, consisting of a primary allegiance to the 
national welfare state and its political elite and a secondary allegiance to the EC. 
Secondary allegiance existed only to the extent that the EC facilitated primary 
allegiance. And primary allegiance continued to depend on a mutually propitious 
exchange relation between rulers and ruled within the national welfare state.
It is this paradoxical aspect of European integration that is highlighted by 
concentrating on allegiance in the case of social policy in Europe. It substan­
tiates the theoretical and substantial relevance and analytical advantage of the 
notion of allegiance and allows for the formulation of hypotheses on the relation 
between social policy, nation-states and European integration that are open to 
falsification in historical and comparative political research.
Social Policy and European Integration: Some Issues and Propositions
In this section I select — from the perspective of allegiance, but still somewhat 
arbitrarily — some issues that can be found in the (growing) literature on social 
policy and integration and propose some propositions on social policy, national 
welfare states and European integration. I start at the level of Treaties, 
appreciating that the dynamic of social policy development is of course not 
entirely Treaty-driven (Leibfried and Pierson 1995b).
The Treaty o f Rome and National Social Policy
The Treaty of Rome gives a low priority to social policy, preoccupied as it was 
with the goal of economic integration. Twelve articles dealt explicitly with social 
policy issues: social provisions (117—122), the European Social Fund 
(123—127), and vocational training (128). Another ten articles were concerned 
with health and safety (30—39) and 2 articles dealt with wages and movement 
of workers (68, 69), although a positive reading might include articles on labour 
mobility (48, 52, 59) (Collins 1975; Brewster and Teague 1989; Room 1991; 




























































































Social policy, however, served one purpose: the removal of potential distortions 
of competition or mobility. In fact, policy development (especially harmoniza­
tion) was understood as more or less automatically following successful 
economic integration (e.g., articles 100—102). Many formulations, moreover, 
mirrored the national concerns of the member states and their disagreements 
rather than any social commitment. Thus, article 117 (first paragraph) argued 
that the members states have agreed upon the need to promote improved 
working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers so as to 
facilitate harmonization. The second paragraph of the same article, however, 
stated that the functioning of the common market itself already favours 
harmonization of social systems.
The article on equal pay for men and women (119), which had little or no 
significance until the mid-1970s, originated in a conflict between France and 
Germany on the possible competitive (dis)advantages of their respective social 
policy regimes. France insisted on inclusion of the article for the promotion of 
equal competition (Baize 1994: 39—42; Ostner and Lewis 1995: 162; Hantrais 
1995).
As Ross (1995) has noted, the EC was barred from most welfare state areas and 
the Commission was — in principle — strictly limited in its social policy 
capacity. The Treaties determined a narrow constitutional room to manoeuvre, 
the national governments prevailed the decision-making process in this already 
strictly confined domain, and any social policy initiatives to be taken therefore 
presupposed a politically prudent Commission.
This absence of social policy in the Treaty of Rome is explained by the crucial 
role of social policy as an instrument of statecraft in the national welfare states. 
National elites were only prepared to surrender social policy to the European 
superstate, if and only if a European social policy could be argued to be 
functional to economic goals that could not be achieved at national level or if 
the risks of inadvertent spillovers were likely to be minimal. European social 
policy was constrained by the Treaty of Rome and by the diplomatic setting that 
defined social policy as belonging to national sovereignty. The deeper logic of 
this concerns primary allegiance, because "virtually all organized social forces 
— political elites and parties, employers, unions, and other — saw the nation as 
their essential location. Social policy became a fundamental mechanism for 
distributing available rewards" (Ross 1995: 360).
Whenever possible, social policy remained the exclusive domain of national 




























































































necessary, EU social policy existed to deal with distortions of economic 
competition.
Eurosclerosis and Faltered Social Policy in the 1970s
Whenever new social policy measures were adopted at European level in the 
1970s, the initiatives rested on:
a) a sense of incapacity among national elites to deal with unexpected 
worsening social and economic conditions (stagflation, unemployment) 
that, although common to all member states, were defined nationally;
b) a sense of incapacity among national elites to deal with unexpected 
new, domestic social and political demands.
Hence the Social Action Programme with such goals as full and better 
employment, the improvement of living and working conditions, and greater 
participation in social and economic decision-making in the Community. 
However, the formulation of the texts typically reinforced the competence of the 
nation-state. The Council Resolution concerning the social action programme 
(21/1/1974, OJ C 13/1 12.2.74) in fact already introduces subsidiarity without 
using the word (see Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994).9 European social 
policy was characterized by a lack of direction, strategies, and instruments and 
by the unwillingness of national governments to surrender their control over a 
crucial instrument of national allegiance.
Single European Act and Qualified Majority
The White Paper on the completion of the internal market did not mention social 
policy, but the Single European Act (SEA) did. Qualified majority voting was 
allowed in the area of health and safety (article 118A, 2). Moreover, regional 
policy (economic and social cohesion, article 130, A—E) gained a more 
prominent place. An activist Commission now began itself to understand social 
policy as a crucial instrument of European statecraft and willfully started to 
permeate policy proposals with carefully camouflaged seeds for future social
9 The Council ’considers that the Community social policy has an individual role to play 
and should make an essential contribution to achieving the aforementioned objectives by 
means of Community measures or the definition of by the Community of objectives for 
national social policies, without however seeking a standard solution to all social problems 
or attempting to transfer to Community level any responsibilities which are assumed more 




























































































policy growth. According to Ross (1995a: 39; 1995b: 363) the staff of the 
Delors Commission used the Russian Doll strategy of which the deeper logic 
"involved building on the EC market-building mandates to move into state­
building areas". On a cynical reading this strategy was adopted with a view to 
lure national governments into supranational social policy-making. A less cynical 
view would hold that the strategy was chosen in order to persuade hesitant 
member states to get over the threshold of social policy as national statecraft 
towards transnational statecraft.
The third dimension of the Paquet Delors, the financial complement of the SEA 
proposed in 1987, built on the commitment to economic and social cohesion and 
proposed an intensification of regional redistribution. The aim was to counteract 
the risk of downward harmonization caused by socioeconomic disparities 
between member states. Here arose a context in which the richer nation-states 
were willing to confront regional inequality by supranational policy. National 
competitiveness was jeopardized by "social dumping" and the "race to the 
bottom" with considerable political risks for the project of European integration. 
A national concern for allegiance, therefore, explains the reform of the structural 
funds, which were doubled in 1988 (Marks 1991; J. J. Anderson 1995).
Social Charter, Maastricht and Subsidiarity: Constraints and Pressures
The preamble of the "Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers" of late 1989 includes an explicit reference to the principle of 
subsidiarity, echoing not only the member states’ concerns (see Rhodes 1995: 
96), but also an awareness that it had become necessary to defend crucial 
national means of statecraft explicitly. In his preface, Delors defined the Social 
Charter as the keystone of the social dimension in the construction of Europe: 
”[i]t incorporates a foundation of social rights which are guaranteed and 
implemented, in some cases at the level of the Member States or at Community 
level depending on the field of competence". Subsidiarity appears in one of the 
considerations in the preamble: "[wjhereas, by virtue of the principle of 
subsidiarity, responsibility for the initiatives to be taken with regard to the 
implementation of these social rights lies with the Member States or their 
constituent parts and, within the limits of its powers, with the European 
Community", immediately followed by the "reassuring" statement, that "the 
solemn proclamation of fundamental social rights at European Community level 
may not, when implemented, provide grounds for any retrogression compared 




























































































The inclusion of subsidiarity in the Social Charter reveals that member states are 
anxiously protecting the national character of the welfare state in order to retain 
social policy as an exclusive domain of statecraft and as an instrument of 
primary allegiance.10 The fate of Europe’s social dimension as promoted by the 
Commission depends to a large extent on the conditions under which constraints 
that impede and forces that propel the development of a European social policy 
are likely to crystallize and steady and are capable of overriding national 
resistance. Form the European perspective, the are four barriers to social reform: 
1) the fragmentation of European political institutions, exemplified by the 
conflicts over the extension of majority voting to social policy at the Maastricht 
summit and the exceptional position Britain was granted; 2) the absence or 
weakness of political forces, notably social democracy and organized labour, and 
other coalitions that can shoulder the expansion of social policy; 3) the 
economic, social and cultural heterogeneity of Europe, that complicates the 
construction of an integrated and harmonized social policy; 4) the fundamental 
diversity of national welfare states that excludes the development of a European 
social policy. According to this analysis
"the welfare state remains the realm of policy competence that still rests firmly in the 
hands of national governments, neither gravitating upward to the EC nor devolving to 
local or regional governments. Given the popularity of most social programs, national 
administrators will not be eager to accept a major transfer of social policy authority” 
(Leibfried and Pierson, 1992: 348; but compare Leibfried and Pierson 1995b).
Are there any pressures that encourage social policy development at EC level? 
First, there is the already mentioned possibility of "social dumping", that is ’the 
prospect that firms operating where "social wages" are low may be able to 
undercut prices of competitors, forcing higher-cost firms to either go out of 
business, reallocate to low-social-wage areas, or pressure their governments to 
reduce social wage costs (Leibfried and Pierson, 1992: 349). Although "social 
dumping" is likely to increase the political demands on national welfare 
arrangements and — if such demands are difficult to meet at the national level 
— on social policy activity of the EU, it is questionable that the risk of dumping 
is high (Mosley 1995). Second, economic integration may constrain the capacity 
of nation-states to pursue or continue national social policies, because these 
emerge as non-tariff barriers to trade, inviting a response from the Commission 
(Leibfried and Pierson 1992: 348—53). But inviting a response is not equal to 
responding, let alone leading to acceptance by the member states. Finally, 
ongoing economic integration may spur the need to extend the meaning of
10 Streeck (1995: 428) sees the Charter as an exercise in comparative labour law, 




























































































European citizenship and accompanying rights. However, needs do not create 
their own fulfillment.
The balance of pressures seems to be such, that it is perhaps difficult for the EU 
not to raise efforts in the domain of social policy, but, as said, pressures or 
"needs" to pursue social policy do not guarantee their own fulfillment. The 
institutions of the EU are likely to take initiatives; the success of such initiatives 
depends on political support at the national level; and national governments 
accept European social policy only if national solutions prove to be deficient. 
The fact that national welfare states have proven to be very resistant to change 
corroborates the general argument.
The Resistance o f National Welfare States to Change
Increasing interdependence, internationalization and globalization of national 
economies are argued to compel national welfare states to dismantle their social 
systems radically for reasons of international competitiveness. Accordingly, 
different national systems are assumed to converge rapidly around a lowest 
common social denominator that is a far cry from the welfare state of the golden 
age.
A similar account is given of the effects of European integration on national 
welfare states. Severe risks of social tourism and social dumping arise as the 
European nation-states gradually abandon their economic borders. National 
welfare states, again for the sake of competitiveness, necessarily adjust their 
social systems quite radically in a struggle for survival in a common market that, 
paradoxically, was itself invented to facilitate and regulate economic competition 
and to preserve welfare (Adnett 1995; Begg and Nectoux 1995; Ferrera 1994; 
Kosonen 1994; Rhodes 1996).
Empirically oriented social and historical studies, however, provide very little 
confirmation of radical changes that the theories so forcefully prophesy. No 
doubt, the empirical evidence documents extensively the immense pressures on 
as well as the massive challenges to the welfare state. Moreover, there is 
evidence for incremental adjustment in the major programmes, decreasing 
growth of social expenditures, and retrenchment. But, paradoxically, there is also 
a substantial gap between the (conservative and neoliberal) political rhetoric of 





























































































Why have the European welfare states been so impervious to radical change in 
spite of the economic, social and political transformation they have experienced 
and in spite of the mounting pressures they are facing? The reason is that the 
politics of retrenchment is fundamentally different from the politics of welfare 
state expansion. National welfare states — contrary to expectations — have not 
been fundamentally transformed in the last two decades or so because radical 
change undermines the national allegiance upon which the very political power 
of the governments that are willing to introduce and implement radical changes 
primarily depends (see Hantrais 1996; Gould 1996; Stephens 1996; Pierson 
1994, 1996; Esping-Andersen 1996).
Allegiance and the Contemporary Problem of Declining Support for 
European Integration
Mario Monti, the Commission’s internal market commissioner recently said:
"It is something of a paradox that people should identify Europe only with budgetary 
sacrifices, which needed to be carried out anyway, and not with the advantages it has 
actually brought" (in The European, 21—27 November 1996).
Thinking in terms of double allegiance and social policy as statecraft explains 
that this is indeed a paradox, that is to say, a seeming contradiction.
There was a time that national and European technocratic and political elites had 
little to worry about public attitudes towards their project of integration. Either 
national publics had no opinion or — to the extent that they did — they supported 
integration in a diffusely positive manner. National publics appeared to consider 
integration as an elite project which presumably and somehow facilitated their 
own government’s attempt to pursue policies in the national interest. And as 
long as their governments succeeded in securing these interests, integration could 
be evaluated as a good thing or at least as nothing to worry about much. There 
was a "permissive consensus" (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) which tolerated 
and warily supported European integration.
Relying on current initiatives in Brussels to launch campaigns that would "bring 
Europe closer to the people", listening carefully to the fashionable yet essentially 
defensive words of Eurospeak like "transparency", "openness", and even 
"subsidiarity", and looking at the Euro-public relations campaign to explain to 




























































































Union’s public image is now taking root (see Lodge 1994; Van Kersbergen and 
Verbeek 1994; Schmitter 1996)."
There seems to be some substantive ground for the elites’ concern. Public 
support for European integration is in decline since 1991 (Anderson and 
Kaltenthaler 1996). This can be observed in European and national opinion 
polls, in the results of the Danish "first no then yes" referenda, the French "noui" 
to the Treaty of Maastricht, and in the results of European elections, most 
recently and significantly in the Austrian elections which put the anti-integration 
FPO almost on a par with the OVP and the SPO.
It is a recurrent and increasingly frequent phenomenon that policy-makers react 
to their own inability to convince others of the correctness of their course by 
redefining the lack of popularity as a harmful effect of a failure of com­
munication and of bad public relations management. Does the public not accept 
the policy or the cherished project? Then surely there must be something wrong 
with the information flow to the public and with the way the policies and 
projects have been communicated. The answer to skeptical public moods and 
decreasing popularity is then better advertisement and propaganda.
However, there is reason to believe that the public Euro-skepticism has little to 
do with bad public relations or a failure of communication. Where political 
science theories and analytic journalism readily seek the root cause of 
deteriorating support in the notorious democratic deficit and the lack of 
legitimacy in general (e.g., Neunreither 1994) and in the secrecy of politics and 
public policy-making in the Council of Ministers in particular, public opinion 
research indicates that the decline of support for European integration may, in 
fact, be associated with worsening expectations of national publics about the 
national economy and social security. Simply put, poor economic and social 
conditions tend to reduce support for European integration (Eichenberg and 
Dalton 1993).
But what is the mechanism explaining the link between national social and 
economic conditions and public support for the European Union? In line with 
the general argument of this paper, the answer would run something like this. 
Governments in the context of a country’s political system are held responsible 1
11 An ambitious Citizens First campaign, costing 24 million Ecu, was recently launched 
(26 November 1996) and informs European citizens about their rights in the single market. 
Another campaign on institutional reform will start after the Intergovernmental Conference 




























































































for growing economic and social insecurity (see C. Anderson 1995). European 
integration as supported by the national political elites will be evaluated as a bad 
thing or at least as something to worry about when further integration, currently 
monetary union, does not so much seem to generate an "ever closer union" but 
rather an ever more austere national policies of retrenchment that reinforces 
social insecurity. The decline of primary or national allegiance explains the 
decline of secondary or European allegiance.
That monetary union will generate considerable advantages for the member 
states in the long run and would therefore reinforce national allegiance is an 
argument that — as most politicians in a representative democracy should know 
— cannot convince voters who see their social security threatened in the short 
run. If a government wants further European integration and if further 
integration means harmful national economic and social policies, then European 
integration is evaluated negatively. This is a threat to national allegiance. It 
shows that support for European integration is much more fragile than the 
prolonged "permissive consensus" and double allegiance suggested. This is 
highlighted by the recent strikes with a distinct anti-European tone in several of 
the member states in the Autumn/Winter of 1995 and of 1996. As I am writing 
this (late November 1996), French truck drivers, joint by train drivers and 
airport personnel, are blocking France’s borders in order to emphasize their 
demands to the employers. The Juppe-govemment is anxious to prevent further 
escalation and offering financial assistance to truck companies to pay for early 
retirement right. Danish truck drivers are blocking the Danish-German border 
in order to defend and expand tax privileges. In doing so, the strikes show how 
crucial social and economic security is for primary allegiance. Moreover, the 
European traffic-jam caused by the strikes tangibly and dramatically underscores 
the extent to which the European economies are interdependent.
I think that the rescue-argument and its emphasis on allegiance assumes a 
contemporary significance. If it is the case that primary, national allegiance was 
secured by integration and a secondary allegiance developed among national 
citizens, because the European publics understood that integration was necessary 
and in their own interest, then the performance of national economies and of the 
social system is the crucial variable for understanding patterns of double 
allegiance. If there is a relation between national performance and integration 
(and between these and allegiance), then this must be a "linear" one. Thus, 
integration is (or is thought to be) beneficial for the national interest, defined in 
social and economic goals by the elite, and this leads the public to believe that 
because the national interest is their interest, integration is good. Allegiance, 




























































































European Union is popular if the national economy performs well from the 
public’s point of view and if economic and social security is not endangered.
In this sense, popular support for integration is critical, but indirectly so. It is the 
fairly prosaic support for national governments to help solve national social and 
economic problems inter- or supranationally which matters, not some remarkable 
pro-European identity or a similar lofty zeal. Moreover, improving the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU will have little effect on double allegiance. The 
fundamental reasons is that European integration, the reassertion of the nation­
state and double allegiance of national publics are part of the same logic. Public 
support for Europe will vary according to national economic and social 
performance, both over time and cross-nationally and this has little to do with 
concerns about legitimacy or with the problem of identity, unless these concerns 
are coupled to a sense of insecurity among national citizenries.
Support for the Union is therefore predominantly utilitarian or evaluative. Recent 
public opinion research (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996) suggests that the 
higher the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the lower the level of 
unemployment, the lower the level of inflation, the earlier the entry into the 
Community, and the longer the length of membership, the higher the public 
support for European integration tends to be. The empirical tests against 
different measures of public support for European integration12 confirm the 
expectations, although GDP appeared to be less relevant than unemployment and 
inflation. This makes sense in terms of allegiance and its emphasis of security 
in exchange for support, for it is the prospect of unemployment and inflation 
rather than a general idea about economic growth that effects a popular sense of 
insecurity.
However, timing and length of membership were found to have consistent 
positive effects on all measures of public support for Europe. This means that 
security is probably not the entire story. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996), 
therefore argue that — in addition to domestic economic performance — the 
timing of entry into the Union (presumed to reflect "original enthusiasm") and 
the length of membership (conjectured to induce a domestic socialization 
process) influence patterns of support since 1973.
12 Three questions were used as an operationalization of the dependent variable that tap 
both the utilitarian and affective dimensions of support: 1) In general, are you for or against 
efforts being made to unify Western Europe?; 2) Generally speaking, do you think that (your 
country’s) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good 
nor bad?; 3) If you were to be told tomorrow that the European Community (Common 




























































































However, I am a bit skeptical about the entry- and socialization-arguments as I 
am not convinced that they tap anything particular. The early entry argument as 
reflecting "original enthusiasm" says more about the elite than about public 
opinion and in any case would probably need to fall back on to the utilitarian 
argument in order to explain why original enthusiasm is reflected in the 
contemporary enthusiasm of the public. The socialization argument holds that 
"joining the EU starts a domestic socialization process, which leads to greater 
awareness and appreciation of the benefits derived from integration, and the set 
of institutions making up the EU more generally (...)" (Anderson and Kaltentha- 
ler 1996: 177). This arguments, in facts, repeats the utilitarian point ("benefits 
from integration") but at the same time assumes that European publics are well 
informed about EU institutions, which is not the case.
The most interesting findings of the research, which corroborates the critique, 
is that "(...) public5 less supportive, the more questions require them to 
calculate the trade-offs of membership (...). On the face of it (...) it is plausible 
that European publics approach the integration process with somewhat of a cost- 
benefit calculus in mind" (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996: 193). This implies 
that the assumed socialization process — i.e. in time a national public is 
familiarized with the institutions of the Union and the effects of integration — 
has no independent positive effect on support for European integration. It is 
therefore primarily domestic economic performance which affects public opinion 
on Europe, and "national and supra-national politics matter to European mass 
publics" (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996: 195) only to the extent that national 
politics provides benefits, possibly through integration.
If we assume that politicians are relatively intelligent, perhaps even rationally 
calculating human beings themselves, then the cost-benefit calculus is a 
characteristic of political processes in a more general sense. Politicians, a 
national political elite, foreign ministers, high level bureaucrats, the European 
technocrats, diplomats, all have a sense of the importance of allegiance not only 
as an asset upon which the success of integration policies ultimately depends, 
but also simply and directly as a factor determining their careers in office. To 
continue the European project national allegiance must be assured.
Conclusion: A Threat to Double Allegiance?
The anxiety of nation-states to protect their authority in social policy does not 




























































































regimes are now largely embedded in the internal market and the two-tier system 
of European social policymaking. In this context, the room for national social 
policymaking is more restricted than before. In particular, three kinds of 
constraints are relevant for national social policymaking: 1) obligations in 
international law to enable cross-border mobility of labour; 2) growing 
interdependence with actors in other national systems; 3) competition between 
national systems for mobile production factors (Streeck 1996: 83—88). A 
supranational, European level of social policy does exist, but has not replaced 
the national welfare state and is restricted in terms of authoritative capacities. 
However, national social policy is affected by integration:
"A supranational social policy regime limited to market-making, forces national social 
policy to devote significant political resources to the opening of national borders (...). 
With market integration laying national welfare states open to unprecedented 
competitive pressures, nationally confined economic and social policies become 
dependent on the voluntary cooperation of mobile production factors, forcing 
governments to rely more and more on the provision of incentives and inducements 
for the latter. In the process national social policy regimes and the national social 
compacts that sustain them are bound to be fundamentally transformed’ (Streeck 1996: 
88) .
Subsidiarity is a symptom of a more general phenomenon that Streeck (1995; 
1996) has recently identified as "neovoluntarism". Neovoluntarism is emerging 
as the central characteristic of the post-welfare state social policy regime of 
Europe. This social policy regime
"fits the political bargain underlying the internal market; conforms with the dictates 
of intergovernmental market making without supranational state-building; and is 
compatible with the fragmented polity in which it is made, with minimized 
supranational regulation and reregulation and high horizontal interdependence" (Streeck 
1995: 423; see Streeck 1996: 77ff).
The Union’s social policies allow "diversity of rules and regimes and choice 
between them, as well as the use of national machinery for dealing with 
international externalities (...)" (Streeck 1995: 424). Neovoluntarism "stands for 
a type of social policy that tries to do with a minimum of compulsory 
modification of both market outcomes and national policy choices, presenting 




























































































it "allows countries to exit from common standards if their polity or economy 
will not sustain them" (Streeck 1995: 424).13
Neovoluntarism in social policy discontinues the European welfare state tradition 
as it resists to guarantee social rights politically and legally. The role of the state 
is diminished, while the roles of the market and of civil society are maximized. 
Therefore, "neovoluntarism returns allocational decisions to private actors in 
private markets, with no possibility previously to readjust their political and 
organizational resources" (Streeck 1996: 83).
The implication of this is that to employ social policy as an instrument of 
national statecraft is increasingly difficult and that, as a result, national and 
therefore European allegiance may be eroded. Moreover, the previous section 
showed that further integration, especially monetary union, may paradoxically 
undermine national allegiance and therefore European allegiance, precisely 
because it subverts the national welfare consensus. The exchange between the 
rulers and the ruled in the European nation-states, once facilitated by economic 
integration, has become less propitious and more arduous. Allegiance is in 
double trouble.
13 In this way, "cohesion" is obtained by mode of exemption. Neovoluntarism also ’gives 
precedence to established national customs and practices and encourages contractual 
agreements between market participants’ (Streeck 1995: 424—5). In this way, "unity" is 
secured by mode of subsidiarity. Neovoluntarism also represents the attempt ’to enlist for 
purposes of governance the subtle, cajoling effects of public recommendations, expert 
consensus on "best practice", explication of the common elements of national regimes, and 
mutual information and consultation* (Streeck 1995: 425). In this manner, "governance" is 
substantiated by means of recommendation, expertise, explication, and consultation. 
Neovoluntarism also ’offers public and private actors menus of alternatives from which to 
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